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ABANDONMENT AND RECONCILIATION:
ADDRESSING POLITICAL AND COMMON
LAW OBJECTIONS TO FETAL HOMICIDE
LAWS
DOUGLAS S. CURRAN†
ABSTRACT
Fetal homicide laws criminalize killing a fetus largely to the same
extent as killing any other human being. Historically, the common law
did not generally recognize feticide as a crime, but this was because of
the evidentiary “born-alive” rule, not because of the substantive
understanding of the term “human being.” As medicine and science
have advanced, states have become increasingly willing to abandon
this evidentiary rule and to criminalize feticide as homicide.
Although most states have recognized the crime of fetal homicide,
fourteen have not. This is largely the result of two independent
obstacles: (judicial) adherence to the born-alive rule and (legislative)
concern that fetal homicide laws could erode constitutionally
protected reproductive rights.
This Note explores a variety of fetal homicide laws that states have
adopted, demonstrating that popular opinion has shifted toward
recognizing this crime. It then directly confronts the objections that
have prevented other states from adopting such laws: it first reviews
the literature suggesting that the born-alive rule should be abandoned,
as it is an obsolete evidentiary standard; it then argues that
constitutionally protected reproductive liberties can be reconciled
with, and in fact augmented by, punishing the killing of a fetus as a
homicide.
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INTRODUCTION
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
1
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.

The question of whether killing a fetus constitutes a homicide
has been considered and debated for centuries. History’s legal giants
2
have weighed in on the issue, countless law review articles and notes
3
4
have tackled it, and politicians at all levels have struggled with it.

1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path of
the Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law
(Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
2. E.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *125–26 (“For if a woman is quick
with child, and by a potion, or otherwise, killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat her, whereby
the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by
the ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But at present it is not looked upon in quite so
atrocious a light, though it remains a very heinous misdemeanor.”); 2 HENRY DE BRACTON,
THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 341 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., Belknap Press 1968)
(1257) (“If one strikes a pregnant woman or gives her poison in order to procure an abortion, if
the foetus be already formed or quickened, and especially if it be quickened, he commits
homicide.”); 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (London, Clarke &
Sons 1809) (“[I]f a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a
dead childe, this is a great misprision, and no murder . . . .”).
3. E.g., Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for Legal
Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 392 (2007) (addressing the legal personhood of fetuses);
Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal
Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 625 (1987) (comprehensively surveying the historical
treatment of feticide and arguing that the born-alive rule was purely evidentiary); Tony
Hartsoe, Person or Thing—In Search of the Legal Status of a Fetus: A Survey of North Carolina
Law, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 169, 237 (1995) (“It is difficult to say what the status of the fetus is
in North Carolina. While there is some case law and several statutes on the subject, there is an
overall paucity of law—case or statutory—that defines the legal status of the fetus.”); Roger J.
Magnuson & Joshua M. Lederman, Aristotle, Abortion, and Fetal Rights, 33 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 767, 777 (2007) (“The criminal law, at least in recent years, has been moving briskly
toward the recognition of the personhood of the unborn.”); Luke M. Milligan, A Theory of
Stability: John Rawls, Fetal Homicide, and Substantive Due Process, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1178
(2007) (“If you take a hard look around, you might get the sense that our society is drifting
toward a bifurcated narrative of the human fetus. One line of the fetal narrative is epitomized
by the restructuring of criminal codes in order to protect fetuses from acts of
violence. . . . [T]here is, of course, another line of the fetal narrative. This is the fetus’s nearabsolute subordination to maternal liberty . . . .”); Laura E. Back, Note, Improperly Performed
Abortion as Fetal Homicide: An Uneasy Coexistence Becomes More Difficult, 18 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 117, 119 (2007) (observing that “someone who assists a woman in terminating a
pregnancy can be charged with murder” and exploring the “constitutional bases for challenging
such a result”); Sandra L. Smith, Note, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim? A Survey of
Current State Approaches and Recommendations for Future State Application, 41 WM. & MARY
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Historically, largely because of technological limitations, the
5
consensus was that a fetus could not be killed (in the legal sense)
6
unless it was first born alive. In the twentieth century, though,
7
medical technology advanced significantly, and this consensus began
8
to erode. Beginning in the 1970s, American jurisdictions have
gradually moved toward a new consensus, and, as of 2009, thirty-six
9
states punish killing a fetus as a form of homicide.
Analytically, this topic is a difficult one—on one hand, it is
hardly controversial to take the position that a fetus is a human
10
11
organism (though the legal personhood of a fetus is hotly debated )
and that, consequently, the killing of a fetus should not go entirely
unpunished. But, on the other hand, those advocates of
constitutionally protected reproductive rights balk at classifying all
12
unborn children as “human beings” for the purposes of homicide
13
statutes. The challenge, then, becomes appropriately protecting
pregnant mothers and their unborn children while still maintaining
reproductive freedoms.

L. REV. 1845, 1880 (2000) (“State legislatures interested in creating fetal homicide statutes
should focus on the pregnant woman as victim, rather than on the fetus itself.”).
4. See infra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
5. See Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1328 (“The rule [that the destruction of a fetus in utero is not a
homicide] has been accepted as the established common law in every American jurisdiction that
has considered the question.”).
6. E.g., White v. State, 232 S.E.2d 57, 57 (Ga. 1977) (“In order to convict for the murder
of a newly born baby it is incumbent upon the State to prove that the child was born alive and
had an independent and separate existence from its mother, and that it was slain by the
accused.” (quoting Logue v. State, 32 S.E.2d 397, 397 (Ga. 1944))).
7. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 631 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J., dissenting)
(“Medical science certainly has progressed to the point of making the ‘born alive’ rule
obsolete.”).
9. Nat’l Right to Life, State Homicide Laws that Recognize Unborn Victims,
http://www.nrlc.org/Unborn_victims/Statehomicidelaws092302.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
10. Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1325 (“An offspring of human parents cannot reasonably be
considered to be other than a human being, and therefore a person, first within, and then in
normal course outside, the womb.”).
11. See, e.g., Melissa Boatman, Bringing Up Baby: Maryland Must Adopt an Equitable
Framework for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes After Divorce, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 285,
299–303 (2008) (discussing the debate regarding the personhood of human embryos).
12. This Note uses “unborn child” and “fetus” interchangeably; no moral or ethical import
is intended to attach to either term.
13. See, e.g., Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky, Recent Developments: The Unborn Victims of
Violence Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 215, 235 (2002) (“[W]hile the Act may not legally affect the
right to abortion, its rhetoric will likely color the abortion debate and the legal battles of the
next century.”).
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This issue was thrust back into the public discourse with the 2007
14
death of Jenna Nielsen, a North Carolina mother of two. Nielsen
was eight months pregnant when she was murdered, and her unborn
15
son perished soon after. Because North Carolina does not recognize
the killing of an unborn child as a homicide, Nielsen’s murderer could
16
not be charged for the death of the fetus. The story gained traction,
the community held vigils, and the public called for legal change.
In the aftermath of Nielsen’s death, Kevin Blaine, Nielsen’s
father, used this public clamor to lead a fight to reform the North
17
Carolina homicide statute. Blaine sought an amendment to the
statute that would recognize unborn children as potential victims of
18
homicide, and state representatives and senators ultimately
19
introduced bills to this end. If the legislature passed such an
amendment and enacted a new law, North Carolina would become
the thirty-seventh state to recognize this crime, leaving only thirteen
20
others that have not done so.
But the legislature must weigh very carefully a countervailing
concern: the potential erosion of constitutionally protected
reproductive freedoms. Many pro-choice advocates understandably
worry that fetal homicide laws encroach on reproductive freedoms
21
and could ultimately result in the outlawing of abortion altogether.
Couched in these terms, it is unsurprising that many oppose the
passage of a fetal homicide law, not because they do not wish to
protect the life of a fetus, but because the issue implicates the politics
22
of reproductive rights.

14. Jenna Nielsen Murder Investigation, WRAL.COM, June 22, 2007, http://www.ncwanted.
com/ncwanted_home/story/1525864.
15. Id.
16. See infra note 23.
17. Erin Coleman, Pregnant Mom’s Slaying Could Help Change Fetal Homicide Law,
WRAL.COM, June 29, 2007, http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1547056.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Marisol Bello, Slain Woman’s Family Wants N.C. Fetal Homicide Law, USA TODAY,
July 8, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-07-08-carrier_N.htm.
21. See, e.g., id. (“Janet Crepps, a staff attorney for the Center for Reproductive Rights,
says fetal homicide laws are part of a broader agenda by abortion opponents to create legal
rights for a fetus in order to set precedents that will help them ban the procedure.”).
22. See, e.g., Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 13, at 235 (“While the [Unborn Victims of
Violence] Act disclaims its power to affect abortion rights, the substance of the UVV appears to
contradict the fundamental premises of abortion law . . . .”).
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Similar to this political objection to legislative recognition of
fetal homicide, the judiciary faces an obstacle of its own. Interpreting
homicide statutes to exclude the killing of a fetus generally results
23
from applying the common law “born-alive” standard. Under this
standard, as its name indicates, a child is not capable of being killed,
24
in the legal sense, unless it has first been born alive. A rule of
25
necessity in previous centuries, the standard reflects the mystery that
26
surrounded pregnancy and the child’s development in the womb.
The courts that have extended the scope of homicide statutes to reach
the killing of a fetus have had to address and overcome this common
27
law hurdle.
Two distinct obstacles thus work in concert to frustrate the
institution of fetal homicide laws: the first is the political concern that
28
treating feticide as homicide would erode constitutionally protected
reproductive freedoms; the second is judicial reluctance to abandon
the born-alive standard. Though fetal homicide is a morally and
philosophically complex issue, this Note operates on a more practical
level by confining itself to addressing only these two fundamental
obstacles.
After synthesizing states’ various approaches to these
29
impediments, this Note lays out methods and rationales for
overcoming these hurdles. First, relying on Clarke D. Forsythe’s oft30
cited work, this Note addresses the judicial, common law obstacle by
showing that the born-alive standard was never intended to
31
substantively define the term “human being.” In so doing, it argues
that this standard, properly understood, should not prevent a

23. See, e.g., State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 1989) (“We conclude that defendant may
not be prosecuted under N.C.G.S. § 14–17, as it now exists, for the killing of a viable but unborn
child.”).
24. See infra Part I.B.
25. Forsythe, supra note 3, at 575 (“[T]he health of the child in utero could not be
established unless and until the child was observed outside the womb.”); see also infra Part I.B.
26. See infra Part I.A.
27. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 735–36 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (“Oklahoma,
by means of this decision, joins a minority of two states whose courts have expressly rejected the
ancient, yet obsolete, born alive rule.”).
28. Throughout this Note, “feticide” refers to the killing of an unborn human child,
irrespective of how the law treats that killing. “Fetal homicide” refers to treating this killing
similarly to a traditional homicide.
29. See infra Parts II–III.
30. Forsythe, supra note 3, at 625.
31. See infra Part IV.A.
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homicide statute from reaching the killing of a fetus. Second, this
Note argues that fetal homicide laws do not meaningfully encroach on
constitutionally protected reproductive rights but rather complement
32
and even augment those rights. Accordingly, the desire to protect a
woman’s constitutional right to an abortion should not counsel
opposition to fetal homicide legislation.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I briefly explores the
historical treatment of feticide, including both the meaning of
“quickening” and the born-alive standard. This Note then discusses
the treatment of feticide in the states: Part II explores the laws of a
variety of states that recognize feticide as homicide, and Part III then
considers the laws of those states that do not. Finally, Part IV
confronts the rationales discussed in Part III, explaining, first, why the
born-alive standard should be abandoned and, second, why fetal
homicide laws do not impinge on reproductive freedoms.
I. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF FETICIDE
Historically, feticide was governed entirely by the born-alive
standard: a fetus that was never born alive could not have been killed
33
in the legal sense. This Part first considers the medical circumstances
that produced this standard and then explores how the law has
treated feticide historically.
A. Medical Standards
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the born-alive
standard became entrenched in the criminal law, medicine was still in
34
its infancy. Much of the human body’s operation was simply beyond
the scientific understanding of the day. As a result, in the context of
pregnancy and fetal development, physicians relied exclusively on

32. See infra Part IV.B.
33. State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 2 (N.C. 1989) (“[T]he common law rule [is] that a viable
fetus cannot be the subject of murder unless it was born alive and subsequently died of injuries
inflicted prior to birth.”). For a comprehensive survey of the historical developments of feticide
and the born-alive standard, see generally Forsythe, supra note 3. Courts considering the bornalive rule have frequently relied on Forsythe. E.g., State v. Trudell, 755 P.2d 511, 513 (Kan.
1988); Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654, 657 (Ky. 2004); Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730,
732 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
34. See Forsythe, supra note 3, at 571 (discussion the “primitive” state of medicine at the
time the born-alive standard developed).
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external observations to verify the vitality of the unborn child.
Thus, without external signs of life, it was presumed that the fetus was
37
not living.
Although doctors of the time generally understood how a woman
became pregnant, they were at a loss to determine at an early stage
38
whether a given woman was in fact pregnant. Doctors could observe
external signs that manifest in the first few months of pregnancy,
including the ceasing of periodic discharge and the firming of the
39
breasts, but these observations were indefinite. Without proof of the
existence of the fetus itself, it was impossible to determine that these
signs were not caused by an unrelated occurrence—illness of the
40
mother, for instance.
Because medicine could not explore or understand the body’s
internal functioning, a woman was not unequivocally “pregnant” until
41
the existence of the fetus was ascertainable externally. This occurred
when the fetus “quickened”; that is, when the mother could feel the
42
fetus move, usually in the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy. It was
only with this observable animation that medicine—and the law—
43
deemed the child to be living. In an age of primitive medicine, this
fetal movement was the first significant event of a pregnancy.
Though quickening provided proof that the fetus was alive, it
remained impossible to ascertain how healthy the child was while still
44
in utero. In this age, pregnancies by no means guaranteed successful
births or healthy infants. Complications were commonplace and

35. See id. (explaining that fetal movement, halfway through gestation, is the “most
undoubted” sign of pregnancy).
36. See id. at 573 (discussing, specifically, fetal movements and heartbeat).
37. See State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (“The high rate of
stillborn deliveries and miscarriages in earlier times created a presumption that an unborn child
would die in the process of childbirth.”).
38. See id. (“[U]ntil recent advances in medical technology, there was no way to determine,
prior to the point of ‘quickening’ (when the baby is felt to move), whether the fetus was alive in
the womb.”).
39. Forsythe, supra note 3, at 571 (quoting VALENTINE SEAMAN, THE MIDWIVES
MONITOR AND MOTHERS MIRROR 25 (New York, Isaac Collins 1800)). Indeed, it was not until
the early twentieth century that modern pregnancy tests were developed. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 573.
42. Id. at 571.
43. Id. at 573.
44. Id. at 575.
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miscarriages were much more frequent than in modern times.
Accordingly, one could not declare with any certainty that a specific
46
child was healthy until that child was born. A live birth
demonstrated not only that the child had been healthy while in the
mother’s womb but also that the infant was able to survive the
stressful and demanding event of the birth itself. Once born alive, the
mystery shrouding the child’s in utero development and health faded,
and the baby had successfully navigated the perils of pregnancy.
B. The Treatment of Feticide
The imprecise and undeveloped medical knowledge of
pregnancy was reflected in the homicide laws of the time. If a
pregnant woman was battered and the fetus was then miscarried or
stillborn, there was no way to prove that the unborn child died as a
47
result of the battery rather than from natural causes. The legally
required but-for causation was lacking: because physicians could not
say that the fetus would have survived but for the assailant’s attack,
no homicide could ever be proved.
The requirement of live birth thus became central to charging
the homicide of an unborn child. The birth demonstrated that the
child was alive and healthy and capable of surviving outside of the
48
mother’s womb. Sir Edward Coke, writing in the seventeenth
century, provided one of the most oft-cited statements of the bornalive rule. Coke wrote:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth
it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in
her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great
misprision [misdemeanor], and no murder: but if the childe be born
alive and dieth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder:
for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura,
49
when it is born alive.

45. See State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing a “high rate
of stillborn deliveries and miscarriages”).
46. See Forsythe, supra note 3, at 575 (discussing common complications arising during
pregnancy that rendered it difficult to determine that a fetus was alive).
47. Id. at 576.
48. See id. at 575 (“[L]ive birth was required to prove that the unborn child was alive and
that the material acts were the proximate cause of death, because it could not otherwise be
established if the child was alive in the womb at the time of the material acts.”).
49. COKE, supra note 2, at 50.
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Thus, if an assailant battered a pregnant woman who then gave birth
to an injured—but living—child, the assailant could be prosecuted for
murder if the child died because of the injuries it had suffered as a
50
result of the assailant’s attack. This was the case even if the infant
lived only for a moment after birth before succumbing to its injuries.
The fact that the child was alive when born was sufficient to provide
the otherwise lacking causation: because the live birth retroactively
demonstrated that the child was healthy when attacked, it could then
be determined that the child would have lived but for the assailant’s
battery.
Thus, the born-alive standard was necessary, in the absence of
advanced medical knowledge and technological innovation, to prove
51
that a criminal act ended an otherwise viable life. It is this standard
52
that U.S. courts and legislatures inherited and that still is upheld in
53
some jurisdictions.
II. THE LAWS OF STATES THAT RECOGNIZE FETICIDE AS
HOMICIDE
54

Killing a fetus is punishable as a homicide in the majority of
55
American jurisdictions, a result that states have reached through
judicial decisions, legislation, or both. Although the practical results
of the states’ approaches may be similar, the variations in the laws
suggest how states that have not criminalized fetal homicide might
prohibit and penalize it. Moreover, exploring the issues that arise
within the context of existing feticide laws demonstrates that
criminalizing feticide is not an all-or-nothing proposition; rather,
judges and legislators can tailor the crime to best fit the political and
moral views of the state’s citizens.

50. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d at 291.
51. Forsythe, supra note 3, at 579 (“[T]hroughout the period of the common law, both the
quickening doctrine and the born alive doctrine related entirely to evidence of life.” (emphasis
added)).
52. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (Mass. 1984) (“The rule [that the
destruction of a fetus in utero is not a homicide] has been accepted as the established common
law in every American jurisdiction that has considered the question.”).
53. See infra Part III.
54. These laws do not apply to abortions. See infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
55. See Nat’l Right to Life, supra note 9 (indicating that thirty-six states recognize fetal
homicide).
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A. Criminalizing Feticide through Judicial Decision
In some states, the killing of a fetus has been classified as
homicide through judicial interpretation of the general homicide
statutes. Reaching such a result requires state high courts to interpret
the term “person” or “human being” in homicide statutes in such a
56
way that includes an unborn child. Although this definition may
seem broad from a historical viewpoint, such an interpretation
indicates that the courts are striving to interpret the laws in a way that
57
accurately reflects modern scientific understanding.
The born-alive standard was the common law rule for centuries,
and every American jurisdiction that considered the issue accepted
58
it. Accordingly, to interpret the term “human being” in a homicide
statute in a way that includes an unborn child requires courts to
specifically abandon the born-alive standard. Some American courts,
including Oklahoma’s high criminal court, have adopted this
interpretation, and have thus recognized the obsolescence of the rule.
59
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in Hughes v. State,
confronted the born-alive standard in a manslaughter case involving a
60
drunk driver. While intoxicated, the defendant drove into oncoming
traffic, collided with another vehicle, and killed the victim’s unborn
61
child. At the time of the accident, the victim was nine months
62
pregnant; the fetus was just four days shy of the due date. The
defendant was found guilty of first-degree manslaughter and, on
63
appeal, argued that because the child was not born alive she could
64
not be charged with criminal homicide.
The court first set the stage for its holding by noting that it “has
the right and duty to develop the common law of Oklahoma to serve
56. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (“Thus, the term
‘human being’ in Section 691—according to its plain and ordinary meaning—includes a viable
human fetus.”).
57. E.g., id. at 732 (“Advances in medical and scientific knowledge and technology have
abolished the need for the born alive rule.”).
58. Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 & n.4 (Mass. 1984).
59. Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
60. Id. at 731.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The child was delivered via emergency cesarean section and had a faint heartbeat at the
time of delivery, though the child had neither blood pressure nor brain activity. Id. at 732. The
court dismissed the argument that the faint heartbeat satisfied the born-alive rule and instead
confronted the rationale of the rule directly. Id.
64. Id. at 731.
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the evolving needs of [the] citizens” and that it would thus construe
65
the homicide statute consistent with this duty. Because “[t]he
purpose of [the homicide statute] is, ultimately, to protect human
life,” the court explained, and because “a viable human fetus is
nothing less than human life,” the term “human being” in the
Oklahoma homicide statute, according to its “plain and ordinary
66
meaning,” necessarily includes a viable human fetus. The court thus
looked to the terms of the statute and assigned to them their plain
meaning as understood in light of modern reason and knowledge. The
judges discarded the centuries-old born-alive rule, even though courts
67
had long applied it.
68
In Hughes, the court deemed the unborn victim “viable,”
meaning that it was capable of surviving independently outside of the
69
mother’s womb. Thus, although the Hughes court had no occasion to
specifically determine whether the viability of the fetus was a
required element of the term “human being” in the Oklahoma
statute, viability was nevertheless an important factor in the court’s
70
analysis.
The Kentucky Supreme Court reached a similar holding in
71
Commonwealth v. Morris, another case involving a viable unborn
72
child. Although observing that “there [was] no need for [the born73
alive rule]” because the fetus’s viability was provable, the Morris
court noted the “definite medical distinction” between an embryo
74
and a viable fetus. Thus, like in Hughes, the Morris court considered
the fetus’s viability when holding that the death of the unborn child
75
came within the scope of Kentucky’s general homicide statute.

65. Id. at 733.
66. Id. at 734.
67. Id. at 736 (“[W]e reject the born alive rule and hold that a viable human fetus is a
‘human being’ against whom a homicide as defined in Section 691 may be committed.”).
68. Id. at 732.
69. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1597 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “viable” to mean
“capable of living, especially outside the womb”).
70. See Hughes, 868 P.2d at 731 (“We now abandon the common law approach and hold
that whether or not it is ultimately born alive, an unborn fetus that was viable at the time of
injury is a ‘human being’ which may be the subject of a homicide . . . .”).
71. Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654 (Ky. 2004).
72. Id. at 659.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 660.
75. Id. The court further noted that it would likely never have the occasion to specifically
consider whether a previable fetus was also included in the term “person” in the Kentucky
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Although the Hughes and Morris courts both included viability
as a factor in determining whether a fetus was within the limits of the
homicide statute, other courts have considered viability entirely
76
irrelevant. In Bailey v. State, the Missouri Court of Appeals
considered whether the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction
for killing the unborn child of a woman who was three months
77
pregnant could be sustained. The fetus was unquestionably
78
79
previable, and the defendant was aware of the woman’s pregnancy.
The Missouri court held that, because of a state statute declaring that
80
all life begins at conception, the court could not “base [its]
interpretation of the term ‘person’ in the homicide statutes on the
81
viability of the unborn child.” Accordingly, Missouri law considers
an unborn child of any gestational age a person under the homicide
82
statute, regardless of viability.
The Missouri legislature’s finding that “[t]he life of each human
83
being begins at conception” and its command that “the laws of [the]
state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of
the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights,
84
privileges, and immunities available to other persons” provided the
authority that compelled the Bailey court to hold that the state’s
85
homicide statutes protect a previable fetus. Though this statute
ultimately broadened the reach of the homicide laws to include the
killing of a fetus, the legislatures of other states have been even more
explicit about their intent to expand their homicide statutes.

homicide statute because the state’s feticide law, which makes any fetus from conception
onward a potential victim of homicide, took effect nine days after the oral arguments in this
case. Id. at 661.
76. Bailey v. State, 191 S.W.3d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
77. Id. at 53.
78. “A fetus generally becomes a viable child between the sixth and seventh month of its
existence . . . .” Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 660 (quoting Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ky.
1955)).
79. Bailey, 191 S.W.3d at 53. In fact, the woman was pregnant with the defendant’s child.
Id.
80. MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000).
81. Bailey, 191 S.W.3d at 55.
82. Id.
83. MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.1(1).
84. Id. § 1.205.2.
85. Bailey, 191 S.W.3d at 55.
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B. Criminalizing Feticide through Legislation
In several states, legislatures have addressed the criminal
treatment of feticide rather than relying on courts to resolve the issue
through the construction of general homicide statutes. This
movement is relatively new, with many such statutes taking effect in
86
the 1980s or later.
1. Motivations for Enactment. Legislatures often criminalize
feticide as a form of homicide in response to court decisions that held,
by applying the born-alive rule, that a fetus could not be a victim
under the general homicide laws. For instance, in 1986 the Minnesota
legislature enacted a statute that imposes a mandatory sentence of life
in prison for anyone who murders an unborn child in the first
87
degree. The legislature specifically enacted the statute to overturn a
then-recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision that adopted the
88
89
born-alive rule. In that decision, State v. Soto, the court held that
the unborn child victim—who was just two weeks short of full term—
was not a human being within the meaning of the Minnesota
90
homicide provisions.
Additionally, legislatures have also enacted fetal homicide laws
as a result of public outcry following particularly heinous crimes
involving the death of unborn children. One well-known instance of
this legislative reaction is the federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act
91
92
of 2004, popularly known as Laci and Conner’s Law. Named in
memory of Laci Peterson and her unborn son, Conner, this federal
fetal homicide statute provides that causing the death of or injury to
an unborn child constitutes a separate offense under a variety of
93
federal criminal laws.
86. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
87. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661 (West 2003).
88. State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 324 (Minn. 1990); Forsythe, supra note 3, at 564.
89. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985).
90. Id. at 630.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006).
92. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, § 1, 118 Stat. 568,
568 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1841 note (2006)) (“This Act may be cited as . . . ‘Laci and Conner’s
Law.’”).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1). Scott Peterson, Laci’s husband and Conner’s father, was
convicted of killing both his wife and unborn child in 2004, Peterson Guilty of Murder,
CNN.COM, Dec. 14, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/11/12/peterson.verdict, and was
subsequently sentenced to death under California law, Peterson Sentenced to Death for Wife’s
Slaying, CNN.COM, Mar. 17, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/16/peterson.case.
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2. Fetal Homicide Statutes. Just as legislators’ motivations for
enacting fetal homicide statutes are varied, so too are the forms the
statutes take and their respective levels of specificity. Some statutes
are painstakingly specific in defining exactly which potential homicide
94
95
victims the law protects, whereas others are vague, leaving the bulk
96
of the definitional task to the state courts. The various methods state
legislatures have employed demonstrate the variety of legislative
approaches available and the ability of lawmakers to tailor legislation
to reflect the political and moral attitudes of their constituents.
a. Comprehensive Regime. In overruling State v. Soto, the
Minnesota legislature enacted a comprehensive statutory regime to
97
criminalize fetal homicide. The statute begins by defining an
“unborn child” as “the unborn offspring of a human being conceived,
98
but not yet born,” and then defines in detail specific crimes involving
99
either injury to or the death of an unborn child. This exhaustive
legislative approach to fetal homicide leaves little, if any, substantive
role for the courts to play in construing and applying the statute.
The statute’s comprehensive nature prevailed in the courts: five
years after Soto and four years after the enactment of these fetal
homicide laws, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the new
100
statutory scheme against equal protection and vagueness challenges.
As a result of that case, which involved the death of a twenty-eight101
day-old embryo, the same court that had previously held that a
viable fetus of eight-and-a-half gestational months was not a victim of
102
homicide validated statutory language making it murder to kill an
Although the federal law, enacted in 2004, was conceived prior to Laci and Conner’s deaths in
2002, the intense media coverage and the public’s general disgust at the murders helped to
inspire renewed congressional interest in enacting a fetal homicide statute. Bush Signs ‘Laci and
Conner’s Law,’ FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 2, 2004, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,115825,00.
html. Similarly, following the death of his daughter, Kevin Blaine and others pressured the
North Carolina legislature to amend the state’s homicide statutes to include unborn children as
potential victims. Bello, supra note 20; see also supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 97–111 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2006) (“Murder is the unlawful killing of a
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.”).
96. See infra notes 112–23 and accompanying text.
97. 1986 Minn. Laws ch. 388 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 609.266–.2691 (2006)).
98. Id. § 609.266(a).
99. Id. §§ 609.2661–.269.
100. State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Minn. 1990).
101. Id. at 324.
102. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn. 1985).
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103

embryo of less than one gestational month. Though the court
opined that the legislature “has enacted very unusual statutes which
go beyond traditional feticide, both in expanding the definition of a
104
fetus and in the severity of the penalty imposed,” it ultimately
acknowledged that “the role of the judiciary is limited to deciding
whether a statute is constitutional, not whether it is wise or prudent
legislation. . . . [The justices] do not sit as legislators with a veto
105
vote . . . .”
Texas has adopted an approach similar to Minnesota’s by
defining an “individual” as “a human being who is alive, including an
unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until
106
birth.” The legislature further defines homicide as “caus[ing] the
107
death of an individual.” By explicitly identifying which fetuses are
protected (in this case, all), the legislature effectively eliminates the
108
need for judicial interpretation of the statute.
Like the Minnesota court in Merrill, a Texas court of appeals
upheld a defendant’s murder conviction under this statute for causing
109
the death of a four-to-six-week-old fetus.
Answering the
defendant’s contention that the statute was unconstitutionally vague
for not distinguishing between a viable and nonviable fetus, the Texas
court stated, “The Texas legislature . . . chose not to incorporate fetal
viability in the capital murder statute . . . . When a woman’s privacy
interests are not implicated, the legislature may determine whether,
110
and at what point, the life of her unborn child should be protected.”
The implication is that the legislature had in fact made that
determination, and, so long as the statute was constitutional, the court
111
would not judge the lawmakers’ wisdom.

103. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 324.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 321.
106. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
107. Id. § 19.01(a).
108. See Lawrence v. State, 211 S.W.3d 883, 891 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (applying the plain
language of the statute and noting that it “clearly states a fetus is an individual from the moment
of fertilization, placing no limitation on the stage of development of the fetus”).
109. Id. at 885.
110. Id. at 892. These rights were implicated in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973), in
which the Supreme Court did distinguish between viable and nonviable fetuses in the abortion
context, id. at 160. The Texas court in Lawrence distinguished between the mother herself
ending the life of a fetus through legal abortion and a third party ending the life of a fetus
through homicide. Lawrence, 211 S.W.3d at 892.
111. See Lawrence, 211 S.W.3d at 890 (deferring to the policy judgments of the legislature).
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b. Statutory Imprecision.
Although states like Texas and
Minnesota have relatively specifically defined which unborn children
are protected by the state’s homicide laws, other legislatures have
enacted imprecise statutes that necessarily rely on the judiciary to
construe and apply them. In striking contrast to the Minnesota
legislature’s fetal homicide regime that consists of several specific
112
offenses spread across multiple sections of the state’s penal code,
California’s fetal homicide law consists merely of a three-word
113
amendment to the state’s general homicide statute. In 1970, in
response to the California Supreme Court’s adherence to the born114
alive rule in Keeler v. Superior Court, the California legislature
inserted the words “or a fetus” into the state’s general homicide
115
statute, which reads, “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human
116
being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.”
Although this amendment expressly indicated the legislature’s
intent for the homicide statute to reach the killing of some unborn
children, it fell to the California courts to determine which unborn
117
children were covered by the term “fetus.” Considering this issue in
1976, the California Court of Appeal, Second District, held that
section 187 applied only to viable fetuses, despite the lack of any
118
explicit reference to viability in the statute itself. But, seventeen
years later, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, directly
119
contradicted the Second District. The Fourth District held that,

112. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266–.2691 (West 2003).
113. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 historical and statutory notes (West 2008) (explaining that
the 1970 amendment added the phrase “or a fetus” after “human being” in defining murder).
The amendment also added two subsections to prevent the feticide law from reaching cases of
legal abortion, id., and thus was actually longer than three words.
114. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 624 (Cal. 1970) (en banc).
115. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 594 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).
116. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187.
117. See People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501–02 (Ct. App. 1976) (“[S]ection 187, as
amended, does not define fetus nor is it consistent with other parts of the Penal Code in which it
is located. . . . In view of the gaps and inconsistencies on both sides of the issue, we rely on
general legal principles interpreted in the light of the factual situation with which the statute
purportedly deals.”), abrogated by Davis, 872 P.2d at 591.
118. Id. at 502. (“Legally and factually, a non-viable fetus does not possess the capability for
independent existence and has not attained the status of independent human life. Logically, one
cannot destroy independent human life prior to the time it has come into existence. . . . We,
therefore, construe section 187 as making its protection coextensive with the capability for
independent human life, a concept embraced within the term viability.”).
119. People v. Davis, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 104 (Ct. App. 1993) (“The courts may not restrict
the application of the fetal murder statute to limit the mother’s interest in continuing her
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although an unborn child must have progressed beyond the
embryonic stage, thus satisfying the plain meaning of the term
120
“fetus,” the child need not be viable. It was not until 1994, almost a
quarter century after section 187 was amended to include the term
“fetus,” that the Supreme Court of California finally resolved the
121
issue. In People v. Davis, the Supreme Court of California adopted
the decision of the Fourth District, holding, “[T]he Legislature [can]
criminalize murder of the postembryonic product without the
imposition of a viability requirement” so long as “the unborn
offspring [is] in the postembryonic period . . . . [that] occurs in
122
humans seven or eight weeks after fertilization.”
Thus, it took California courts nearly two-and-a-half decades to
precisely define which unborn children are protected under the
homicide statute. This timeline stands in stark contrast to the
Minnesotan experience, in which the state supreme court, just four
years after it had adopted the born-alive rule, affirmed a statutory
123
scheme that made it murder to kill a twenty-eight-day-old embryo.
3. The Role of Knowledge and Intent. Finally, when drafting fetal
homicide statutes, legislators must address the problematic issues of
knowledge and intent. Because a pregnant woman is not always
obviously pregnant, one can imagine a scenario in which a criminal
defendant charged with the homicide of an unborn child could deny
knowing—or could actually not know—that the woman was
124
pregnant. For these situations, legislators must determine whether
to impose something akin to strict liability on defendants, or instead
to require intent to harm the fetus as an element of the crime. As with
other feticide issues, states have come down on both sides.
In Illinois, for instance, the fetal homicide statute incorporates an
actual-knowledge requirement, and courts apply the requirement
strictly. Initially, Illinois’s fetal homicide statute required only that

pregnancy and the state’s interest in protecting fetal life to include only viable fetuses. We
respectfully reject Smith’s requirement that a fetus be viable in order to be [murdered].”).
120. Id. The embryonic stage lasts until the seventh or eighth gestational week. Id.
121. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).
122. Id. at 599 (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. 1990) (considering the
defendant’s contention that “it is unfair to impose on the murderer of a woman an additional
penalty for murder of her unborn child when neither the assailant nor the pregnant woman may
have been aware of the pregnancy”).
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the defendant “knew, or reasonably should have known under all the
125
In 1986, the
circumstances, that the mother was pregnant.”
legislature replaced the statute’s part-subjective, part-objective
measure of knowledge with the more stringent requirement that the
defendant “knew that the woman was pregnant” at the time of the
126
crime.
Thus, the Illinois legislature determined that actual
knowledge of the woman’s pregnancy should be a required element
127
of the crime of “Intentional Homicide of an Unborn Child.”
The Appellate Court of Illinois recognized and applied this
128
actual-knowledge requirement in People v. Gillespie. In that case,
the prosecution neglected to definitively prove that the defendant had
129
actual knowledge of the victim’s pregnancy, despite the fact that the
mother was seven months pregnant and the defendant was the father
130
of the child.
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the
131
defendant’s conviction for intentional homicide of an unborn child,
explaining, “The defendant’s knowledge of pregnancy is an essential
element of the offense. The [1986] change in the statute reflects
legislative concern that something less than actual knowledge would
132
be used to convict someone of this serious crime.”
Contrary to the fairly rigorous requirement that the Illinois
legislature imposed, the Minnesota statute demands somewhat less
133
than actual knowledge, as State v. Merrill demonstrates.
In
Minnesota, “[m]urder of an unborn child in the first degree,”
134
punishable by a mandatory life sentence, requires only that the

125. People v. Gillespie, 659 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
38 ILL. REV. STAT. § 9-1.1 (1981)).
126. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2(a)(3) (West 2002).
127. Id. Lesser crimes, including voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child, id. at 5/9-2.1,
and involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide of an unborn child, id. at 5/9-3.2, do not
require actual knowledge of the mother’s pregnancy.
128. People v. Gillespie, 659 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
129. Id. at 16 (“In short, there is a failure of proof. . . . Taking the State’s evidence in its
most favorable light, we do not see how it can be said the defendant’s knowledge of Cook’s
pregnancy was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
130. Id. at 15.
131. Id. at 16.
132. Id. at 15.
133. See State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. 1990) (“The possibility that a female
homicide victim of childbearing age may be pregnant is a possibility that an assaulter may not
safely exclude.”).
134. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661 (West 2006) (“Whoever does any of the following is
guilty of murder of an unborn child in the first degree and must be sentenced to imprisonment
for life . . . .”).
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defendant act with the “intent to effect the death of the unborn child
135
or of another.” The Merrill court upheld the constitutionality of this
statute, despite the defendant’s contention that “it is unfair to impose
on the murderer of a woman an additional penalty for murder of her
unborn child when neither the assailant nor the pregnant woman may
136
have been aware of the pregnancy.” The court explained,
The fair warning rule [of the Due Process Clause] has never been
understood to excuse criminal liability simply because the
defendant’s victim proves not to be the victim the defendant had in
mind. . . . The possibility that a female homicide victim of
childbearing age may be pregnant is a possibility that an assaulter
137
may not safely exclude.

Thus, in Minnesota, so long as the defendant intended to kill
someone, the courts can sustain a conviction for the first-degree
murder of a fetus.
*

*

*

Despite taking a variety of approaches, each of the states
discussed in this Part, and states like them, treat the wrongful killing
of an unborn child as a homicide. A minority of American
jurisdictions, however, have not similarly reformed their laws.
III. THE LAWS OF STATES THAT DO NOT RECOGNIZE FETICIDE AS
HOMICIDE
Though the majority of American states consider the killing of a
138
fetus to be a homicide, fourteen do not. Historically, the failure to
criminalize feticide was often a result of judicial interpretation of
“person” or “human being” in the relevant homicide statute: by
staying faithful to the born-alive rule, courts declined to extend the
coverage of homicide laws to fetuses. To illustrate these decisions’
underlying rationale, Section A explores representative cases.

135. Id. § 609.2661(1).
136. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 323.
137. Id.
138. These states are Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, and Wyoming.
See Nat’l Right to Life, supra note 9 (listing the thirty-six states that have some form of fetal
homicide laws).
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But no matter how the judiciary interprets and applies the
common law, the legislature can always codify new standards and
definitions. Accordingly, any failure to criminalize feticide is equally a
result of legislative inaction. Section B thus examines and critiques
legislative rationales for not enacting fetal homicide laws.
A. Judicial Justifications for Continued Adherence to the Born-Alive
Rule
Several courts, most prominently the Supreme Court of
139
California in Keeler v. Superior Court, have held that a fetus does
not fall within the scope of a state’s general homicide statute. In
Keeler, the defendant was charged with murder after he attacked his
140
pregnant ex-wife and purposefully killed her unborn child. The
defendant’s intention to kill the child was undisputed, evidenced by
141
his declaring that he was “going to stomp [the fetus] out of [her].”
142
Doctors confirmed that the attack caused the unborn child’s death.
Despite the defendant’s intention to kill the unborn child, the
California court determined the defendant’s actions did not constitute
143
murder under the homicide statute. The court examined the
legislative history and noted that the legislature intended the statute
to encapsulate the “settled common law meaning” of the term
144
“human being” at the time the statute was enacted in 1850. Because,
according to the court, the common law definition of “human being”
was “a person who had been born alive,” the legislature “did not
intend the act of feticide . . . to be an offense under the laws of
145
California.”
The court explained that only the legislature, not the courts, had
the power to deviate from the common law definition of “human
being”: “For a court to simply declare, by judicial fiat, that the time
has now come to prosecute under section 187 one who kills an unborn
but viable fetus would indeed be to rewrite the statute under the guise
139. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (en banc).
140. Id. at 619. The defendant’s ex-wife was between seven and eight-and-a-half months
pregnant. Id. at 619 n.1.
141. Id. at 618.
142. Id. As a pathologist determined, the fetus died from severe fracturing of the skull and
the consequent cerebral hemorrhaging. Id.
143. See id. at 624 (holding that California’s homicide law does not prohibit “killing an
unborn fetus”).
144. Id. at 622.
145. Id.
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146

of construing it.” Thus, the common law born-alive rule persevered,
and the defendant could not be prosecuted for the homicide of the
147
unborn child.
As discussed, Keeler was overruled by a legislative amendment
148
to section 187 less than one year after the case was decided.
Nevertheless, this case provides a salient example of a court’s
reasoning, made all the more striking by the extreme nature of the
facts. Moreover, the reasoning the Supreme Court of California
employed in Keeler is typical of other courts that have considered the
149
issue and have upheld the born-alive rule.
B. Political Justifications for Declining to Enact Fetal Homicide
Legislation
The endurance of the born-alive standard is equally a result of
legislative inaction as it is of judicial reluctance to modify the scope of
homicide statutes. The political arguments against fetal homicide laws
reflect a concern that criminalizing fetal homicide is the first step
down a slippery slope that will ultimately lead to the banning of a
150
woman’s right to a legal, controlled abortion. Opponents worry that
146. Id. at 625–26.
147. The California court also held that, even if it were inclined to hold that “human being”
included a fetus, the state could not charge the defendant in this case with murder because
applying the definition retroactively would violate the Due Process Clause. See id. at 626–30
(explaining that retroactive implementation would run afoul of the Due Process Clause’s
traditional notice requirement).
148. See supra note 114–116 and accompanying text.
149. One similar decision that does continue to operate as controlling precedent is the North
Carolina case State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989). In that case, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that the state homicide statute did not actually define “murder.” Id. at 1–2
(“Murder under [that statute] is murder as defined at common law.”). Referencing the historical
discussion in Keeler, the court then asserted that, because “[i]t is beyond question that . . . the
killing of a viable, but unborn child was not murder at common law,” neither was it murder
under the North Carolina statute. Id. at 2. Like their California counterparts, the North
Carolina judges held that altering the scope of the homicide statute was purely the prerogative
of the legislature. Id. at 4.
Other states have also employed this sort of reasoning. See, e.g., State v. Trudell, 755
P.2d 511, 516 (Kan. 1988) (“[I]f it is the desire of the people in Kansas to give the same
protection to a fetus as it gives to a human being, it is the legislative branch which is the proper
forum to resolve the issue.”); People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775, 780–81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(per curiam) (“Although we find that the ‘born alive’ rule is archaic and should be abolished in
prosecutions brought under the negligent homicide statute, the abolition of the rule is a matter
for action by the Legislature.”).
150. E.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union, What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, (July 31, 1996)
http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/gen/16530res19960731.html (“[The ACLU has] serious
reservations about legislation designed to protect fetuses, because it can endanger women’s
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recognizing fetuses as potential homicide victims is a step toward
imbuing fetuses with full legal personhood, which would necessarily
151
curtail a woman’s reproductive liberties. This Section describes
these arguments and their supporting logic, and Part IV.B then offers
a response.
Many abortion rights advocates, although recognizing the need
to punish feticide, object to the implications of statutes that
152
criminalize these killings to the same degree as other homicides.
They maintain that granting the unborn child personhood in the
153
homicide context would necessarily strengthen the fetus’s legal
rights in the abortion context. These rights would be strengthened,
they argue, despite the fact that feticide statutes often specifically
154
disclaim the ability to impinge on abortion rights.
Various
commentators have advanced such an argument in response to the
155
federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, including the
following:

rights by reinforcing claims of ‘fetal rights’ in the law. Anti-choice organizations have long
promoted fetal protection legislation as one prong of their campaign to eliminate the right to
choose. . . . Passage of fetal protection laws gives anti-choice forces a propaganda coup and a
launching pad for arguments to restrict abortion.”); Do Fetal Rights Limit Mothers’ Rights?,
STATE LEGISLATURES, June 2002, at 6, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/SLJune2002p6.pdf
(“Those on the other side fear that laws to protect a fetus could infringe on a woman’s right to
choose an abortion. Pro-choice advocates say such laws grant a fetus legal status distinct from
the pregnant woman—possibly creating an adversarial relationship between a woman and her
baby.”); NARAL Pro-Choice Mont., HB 730: The Fetal Homicide Act, http://www.
prochoicemontana.org/voting_hb730.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) (“If the goal is to more
severely punish crimes against pregnant women, there are better ways. . . . There is no need,
aside from undermining Roe v. Wade, to define the fetus as separate from the woman.”); Nat’l
Conference of State Legislatures, Fetal Homicide, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
health/fethom.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) (“Those on the other side feel that laws to protect
a fetus could become a ‘slippery slope’ that could jeopardize a woman’s right to choose an
abortion.”).
151. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (“For the stage subsequent to viability,
the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate,
and even proscribe, abortion . . . .”).
152. See sources cited supra note 150.
153. Not all statutes actually grant fetuses personhood. California’s homicide statute, for
instance, specifically distinguishes between a human being and a fetus: “Murder is the unlawful
killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West
2008).
154. For example, the Minnesota statute separates feticide from abortion: “Sections
609.2661 to 609.268 [the sections defining the crimes against the unborn] do not apply to any act
described in section 145.412 [the section defining legal abortion].” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.269
(West 2003).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006).
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While the Act disclaims its power to affect abortion rights, the
substance of the UVV appears to contradict the fundamental
premises of abortion law—that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments do not include fetuses in the definition of “person”—
by punishing violence against fetuses by third parties as harshly as
violence against human beings. . . . [W]hile the Act may not legally
affect the right to abortion, its rhetoric will likely color the abortion
156
debate and the legal battles of the next century.

Several members of Congress who opposed the Unborn Victims
of Violence Act echoed this concern. During a Senate floor debate in
March 2004, Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold stated,
I will oppose H.R. 1997, The Unborn Victims of Violence Act . . . . I
join with . . . the supporters of this bill in condemning acts of
violence against women, including pregnant women. . . . I believe
that acts of violence against pregnant women are deplorable and
should be punished severely. Congress has taken and should
continue to take steps to protect women from violence and
prosecute those who attack them. But I am concerned that by
recognizing the fetus as an entity against which a separate crime can
be committed, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act may undermine
women’s reproductive rights as set forth by the Supreme Court in
157
Roe v. Wade.

Similarly, after President Bush signed the act into law in April 2004, a
spokesman for Senator John Kerry responded:
John Kerry strongly supports making it a federal crime to commit an
act of violence against a pregnant woman. He agrees with the vast
majority of Americans who want tough punishment for anyone who
would commit such heinous crimes and know we can do so without
158
undermining a woman’s right to choose.

In addition to concerns regarding the potential of fetal homicide
laws to undermine a woman’s constitutionally protected right to an
abortion, opponents of these laws have argued that focusing on the
harm to the fetus wrongly detracts attention from the harm to the
159
mother. Similarly, some have argued that imbuing a fetus with full

156. Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 13, at 235.
157. 150 CONG. REC. S3149 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
158. Bush Signs ‘Laci and Conner’s Law,’ supra note 93.
159. Jennifer A. Brobst, The Prospect of Enacting an Unborn Victims of Violence Act in
North Carolina, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 127, 128 (2006).
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legal personhood necessarily reduces the personhood of the mother.
For instance, condemning calls for fetal homicide laws in Canada, one
Canadian pro-choice activist asserts, “If we give any legal rights to a
fetus, we must automatically remove some rights from women,
because it’s impossible for two beings occupying the same body to
161
enjoy full rights.” She continues, “If we try to ‘balance’ rights [of the
unborn child and the mother], it means the rights of one or both
162
parties must be compromised . . . .” Faced with such arguments
defending mothers’ constitutional rights and legal personhood,
legislative reluctance to enact comprehensive fetal homicide statutes
seems reasonable.
IV. THE CASE FOR FETAL HOMICIDE LAWS
The principal purposes of homicide laws are to prevent and
punish the extreme antisocial behavior that is the taking of another’s
life for no justifiable cause. To be effective, these laws should classify
taking a human life as a homicide even if the victim is unborn.
Criminalizing feticide would not only hold accountable those who end
the life of a fetus but would also augment the reproductive freedoms
guaranteed to women. Setting out this argument, Section A addresses
the born-alive rule and Section B then responds to concerns of the
opponents of fetal homicide laws.
A. Why States Should Abandon the Born-Alive Rule
Several courts have invoked Sir Edward Coke’s statement of the
163
born-alive rule to support the proposition that, at common law, a
164
child was not a human being unless and until it had been born alive.
But this understanding of the born-alive rule is misguided, as one

160. E.g., Elizabeth Spiezer, Comment, Recent Developments in Reproductive Health Law
and the Constitutional Rights of Women: The Role of the Judiciary in Regulating Maternal Health
and Safety, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 507, 509 (2005) (“[T]o protect the rights of all women, American
laws must prioritize each woman’s autonomous interests above a historically determined
maternal role.”).
161. Joyce Arthur, Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada, The Case Against a “Fetal
Homicide” Law, http://www.arcc-cdac.ca/fetal_homicide_law.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
162. Id.
163. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 622 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (holding that
the murder statute only applies to children born alive); see also Forsythe, supra note 3, at 603
(“Throughout [the Keeler opinion], the court assumed that the rule was a substantive element at
common law, which designated the unborn child as non-human.”).
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165

scholar, Clarke D. Forsythe, convincingly demonstrates. As Part I.B
illustrates, the born-alive rule was evidentiary in nature, adopted to
address the problems of proving causation when the victim of the
homicide was an unborn child; it was not intended to be a substantive
166
definition of “human being.” As Forsythe explains, “[A]t common
law, the rule was entirely an evidentiary standard, mandated by the
primitive medical knowledge and technology of the era . . . the rule in
its origin was never intended to represent any moral judgment on the
167
criminality of killing an unborn child in utero.”
Nevertheless, Sir Coke’s rule has persevered and is often
considered the expression of the common law view on the homicide of
168
unborn children. But, in the thirteenth century, well before Sir
Coke’s time, another English jurist, Henry de Bracton, published
quite a different statement regarding fetal homicide: “If one strikes a
pregnant woman or gives her poison in order to procure an abortion,
if the foetus be already formed or quickened, and especially if it be
169
quickened, he commits homicide.” In direct contradiction of Coke’s
statement, Bracton’s view supports the contention that the born-alive
rule was merely an evidentiary standard. Although Bracton’s view
170
may have been abandoned because it proved practically infeasible,
its mere existence demonstrates that, as long ago as the 1200s, at least
one major jurist considered an unborn child to be a potential victim of
homicide from the time of conception, not just from the time of birth.
That the born-alive rule was adopted for evidentiary purposes
171
does not, as some modern courts have held, define an unborn child

165. See generally Forsythe, supra note 3 (demonstrating the evidentiary nature of the bornalive rule).
166. Id. at 564.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Keeler, 470 P.2d at 620 (“Perhaps the most influential statement of the ‘born
alive’ rule is that of [Coke]. . . . [T]he common law accepted [Coke’s] views as authoritative.”).
169. 2 DE BRACTON, supra note 2, at 341.
170. See Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654, 656 (Ky. 2004) (“The reason for the
[born-alive] rule was ‘non constat [it could not be established], whether the child were living at
the time of the batterie or not, or if the batterie was the cause of death.’” (second alteration in
original) (quoting Sims’s Case, (1601) 75 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B.))).
171. E.g., People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (Ct. App. 1976) (“Legally and factually, a
non-viable fetus does not possess the capability for independent existence and has not attained
the status of independent human life. . . . Until the capability for independent human life is
attained, there is only the expectancy and potentiality for human life.”), abrogated by People v.
Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
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as something other than a human life. As the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts explained, “An offspring of human parents
cannot reasonably be considered to be other than a human being, and
therefore a person, first within, and then in normal course outside, the
173
womb.” The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma agreed:
“[P]roblems in proving causation do not detract from the personhood
174
of the victim.”
The born-alive rule was thus intentionally underinclusive—the
killers of some unborn children who deserved punishment went free
in the interest of protecting others from being wrongfully convicted.
The rule was a blunt instrument, but in the absence of more advanced
175
medical understanding, it was a necessary protection. In the modern
world of ultrasounds, endoscopes, and deeper knowledge of human
development and causes of death, however, the protections of the
176
177
born-alive standard are no longer necessary. The rule is obsolete.
Because the born-alive rule was not intended to be a substantive
definition of “human being,” it can be abandoned without altering the
scope of existing homicide statutes. Evidence shows that the term
“human being,” from the time of Bracton, included those who had yet
178
to be born. Fetuses that were not born alive were only exempted as
victims under the common law murder statutes because of evidentiary
obstacles to proving the cause of an unborn child’s death, not because
they were outside the definition of “human being.”
172. This interpretation is different from arguing that an unborn child should enjoy the same
protections as every other human being. The point is simply that an unborn human child is, in
fact, a human life, whether or not it has been born.
173. Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1984).
174. Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 732 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (quoting Cass, 467 N.E.2d
at 1325). The Massachusetts and Oklahoma courts discussed fetal personhood in the context of
construing the relevant homicide statutes; whether the courts intended these statements
regarding personhood to extend beyond the feticide context is immaterial for this Note’s
purposes. The point is merely that an evidentiary standard does not affect the underlying
substantive definition.
175. Id. (“The born alive rule was necessitated by the state of medical technology in earlier
centuries.”).
176. See id. (“Advances in medical and scientific knowledge and technology have abolished
the need for the born alive rule.”).
177. E.g., State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 631 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J., dissenting) (“Medical
science certainly has progressed to the point of making the ‘born alive’ rule obsolete.”); Hughes,
868 P.2d at 735–36 (“Oklahoma, by means of this decision, joins a minority of two states whose
courts have expressly rejected the ancient, yet obsolete, born alive rule.”); see also
Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (Mass. 1984) (“[T]he antiquity of a rule is no
measure of its soundness.”).
178. See supra text accompanying note 169.
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Thus, if the major obstacle to classifying feticide as homicide was
179
the inability to prove causation, and the advance of medical
180
technology has since removed that obstacle, it stands to reason that
fetuses are, in fact, potential victims under existing homicide statutes,
even if those statutes are based on the common law. Claiming that the
method of proving the causal link between the actus reus and the
injury affects the definition of the crime itself is not reasonable.
Considering fetuses to fall within the scope of a common law
homicide statute does not impermissibly extend the scope of the
statute, but rather gives fuller effect to the original language.
Applying a statute more fully and accurately does not, as some courts
181
have asserted, constitute judicial creation of a new crime.
One response to this argument is that, whatever the common law
definition of “human being” actually was, if a legislature enacted a
homicide statute with the understanding that a fetus was not a
“human being,” then that statute should not include a fetus in its
scope. But, to the extent legislative intent is pertinent—and that
intent was to incorporate the common law—courts should construe
the statute to actually reflect the common law at the time, rather than
give effect to the individual legislators’ misunderstanding of the
common law.
One telling example is the California Crimes and Punishments
Act of 1850. Because this act was the California legislature’s first
attempt to codify common law crimes, the act’s “precedents were
182
necessarily drawn from the common law.” When construing the
state’s homicide statute, the California Supreme Court relied on this
common law foundation to support its assertion that feticide was

179. Forsythe, supra note 3, at 576.
180. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 732 (“Advances in medical and scientific knowledge and
technology have abolished the need for the born alive rule.”).
181. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 625–26 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (“For a
court to simply declare, by judicial fiat, that the time has now come to prosecute under section
187 one who kills an unborn but viable fetus would indeed be to rewrite the statute under the
guise of construing it.”); State v. Anonymous, 516 A.2d 156, 159 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986)
(declining to “redefin[e] . . . the word ‘person’ [because such task] must be left to the legislature,
which has the primary authority to define crimes”); People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775, 778
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (per curiam) (choosing to not recognize fetal homicide because “the
Legislature had the opportunity to include unborn fetuses in the statute, but did not do so”);
State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn. 1985) (rejecting a proposed expansion of the
“common law definition of ‘person’ or ‘human being’” in the homicide statute to encompass the
fetus).
182. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 619.
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beyond the scope of the statute because the common law definition of
183
human being did not include fetuses.
But because the born-alive requirement was not an element of
the substantive common law definition of human being, the desire to
exclude a fetus from the protection of the homicide statute should not
be imputed to the legislature. As the court itself explained, “It will be
presumed, of course, that in enacting a statute the Legislature was
familiar with the relevant rules of the common law, and, when it
couches its enactment in common law language, that its intent was to
184
continue those rules in statutory form.”
Thus, regardless of
individual legislators’ understanding of the common law definition of
human being, courts should presume that the legislature as a whole
intended to codify the actual common law definition.
B. Why Fetal Homicide Laws Do Not Curtail Reproductive Rights
Many who oppose feticide legislation do so out of the concern
that recognizing unborn children as human beings in the homicide
context will undermine a woman’s constitutional right to an
185
abortion. Although this concern is not entirely unfounded, it is
largely misplaced. Because of the sensitive nature of the legal rights
of
unborn
children,
legislatures—without
exception—have
specifically provided that the fetal homicide statutes are not to be
construed to in any way obstruct a woman’s right to a legal
186
abortion. Additionally, some state legislatures have exempted the
mother of the unborn child from liability under the statute
187
altogether. Accordingly, not only are these statutes inapplicable in
the abortion context, but many are inapplicable to any action taken
by the mother whatsoever.
In addition to the express protections legislatures have given in
the statutes, courts have recognized that the consent of the mother is
the crucial element that distinguishes feticide from abortion. For
188
instance, in State v. Holcomb,
the defendant, convicted of
murdering a woman and her unborn child, argued that “all intentional

183. Id. at 622; see also supra note 145 and accompanying text.
184. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 619.
185. See supra Part III.B.
186. See supra note 154.
187. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266(b) (West 2006). This
“Definitions . . . (b) ‘Whoever’ does not include the pregnant woman.” Id.
188. State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).

statute

reads,
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and unjustified killings of pre-born children must be treated the
same,” and thus his killing of the unborn child should be treated as an
189
abortion rather than a homicide. The Missouri Court of Appeals
rejected this argument outright because “the mother did not consent
190
to the actions.” Although this holding may seem unexceptional, it
offers women an additional layer of protection because, in the end, it
is the subjective intention of the mother that actually controls.
Consequently, the regime created by enacting fetal homicide
statutes is one in which the personhood of the fetus is determined
191
entirely by the mother’s subjective intent. If the mother intends to
terminate her pregnancy with a legal and controlled abortion, then
the law would not consider her fetus a person, and the pregnancy
192
could be legally ended. If, however, the mother desires to carry her
pregnancy to term, then the law would consider her fetus a person,
and the protections of the homicide statutes would apply. Though a
legal fiction, the regime is nevertheless workable.
So, although fetal homicide laws may seem antithetical to a
woman’s ability to secure a legal abortion, these statutes actually
augment a woman’s power to control her reproductive capacity and
to choose the course of her pregnancy. In the absence of a fetal
homicide statute, events such as those in Keeler—in which a third
party intentionally ends a woman’s pregnancy by attacking her
unborn child—could go unpunished. Thus, fetal homicide laws
operate as the mirror image to a woman’s right to an abortion: while
the right to an abortion protects a woman’s choice to end an
unwanted pregnancy, fetal homicide laws protect a woman’s choice to
carry a wanted pregnancy to term. In this way, fetal homicide laws
and abortion rights work as complements, not adversaries.
Further, the more nebulous argument that the rhetoric of fetal
homicide laws “will likely color the abortion debate and the legal

189. Id. at 292.
190. Id.
191. This may lead to some interesting situations, but is still logically consistent. See, e.g.,
Milligan, supra note 3, at 1178 (“Imagine, for instance, a pregnant woman who approaches an
abortion clinic with the intention of terminating her pregnancy. In one scenario, she is mugged
at the entrance, and, due to the ensuing trauma, has a miscarriage. The law holds that a ‘person’
was ‘murdered,’ and it punishes the perpetrator with a life sentence in jail. In the second
scenario, the woman evades the mugger, enters the clinic safely, and undergoes a successful
abortion procedure. Here the law holds that no crime was committed.”).
192. This determination would still be subject to the limitations of Roe v. Wade.
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193

battles of the next century” is simply not a strong enough concern to
justify denying women and unborn children the protection of feticide
statutes. Many staunchly pro-choice scholars agree with this position,
194
including Professor Walter Dellinger, who has stated, “I don’t think
[fetal homicide statutes] undermine Roe v. Wade . . . . The legislatures
can decide that fetuses are deserving of protection without having to
make any judgment that the entity being protected has freestanding
195
constitutional rights.” This observation reflects the key attribute
making fetal homicide and abortion entirely analytically distinct: fetal
homicide laws govern conduct by third parties against the fetus,
whereas the right to an abortion governs the relationship between a
196
mother and her own unborn child. Though both fetal homicide and
abortion involve the law’s treatment of unborn human beings—an
emotional topic to be sure—the similarity ends there; the law can
punish feticide and still protect abortion rights.
The argument can be cast in terms of cost-benefit analysis: the
benefits created by protecting a mother’s interest in carrying her
pregnancy to term, weighed against the costs imposed by the
potential of fetal homicide laws to (inappropriately) affect the
abortion debate. But, though a mother’s interest in giving birth to her

193. Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 13, at 235.
194. Professor Dellinger is a partner at O’Melveny & Myers LLP, a professor of law at
Duke University School of Law, a former Acting Solicitor General and White House adviser to
President William Clinton, and a long-time NARAL supporter.
195. Anne Blythe, A Question of Rights, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 13, 2003,
at A21.
196. In Lawrence v. State, the Texas court observed,
The rights and interests addressed by the Roe Court, however, are not the same as
those at issue in this case. In Roe, the Court was attempting to balance the privacy
rights of a woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy with the state’s interest in
protecting the woman’s health as well as the life of her unborn child. In this case,
appellant murdered Smith and her unborn child. Obviously, appellant has no
constitutional right to murder a pregnant woman. The State’s interest in this case is in
protecting its citizens and their unborn children from murder and imposing maximum
criminal liability on individuals such as appellant who, by his own criminal conduct,
terminated Smith’s pregnancy at the same time he ended Smith’s life. Thus, the
individuals’ and states’ interests at issue in the two cases are clearly distinguishable.
Lawrence v. State, 211 S.W.3d 883, 891–92 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). Similarly, the California court
noted,
[A] defendant who assaults a pregnant woman, causing the death of her fetus, and a
pregnant woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy are not similarly situated.
“A woman has a privacy interest in terminating her pregnancy; however, defendant
has no such interest. The statute simply protects the mother and the unborn child
from the intentional wrongdoing of a third party.”
People v. Davis, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 103–04 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting People v. Ford, 581
N.E.2d 1189, 1199 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)).
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child is fundamental and very real—and the benefits derived from
protecting that interest are substantial—the costs imposed by fetal
homicide laws are more speculative in nature. Proponents of the
slippery slope argument have not described how fetal homicide laws
affect abortion rights, but instead point to the potential for these laws
197
to “color” the abortion debate. But, importantly, though the earliest
fetal homicide statutes were enacted decades ago, nothing indicates
that they have altered the abortion debate in any significant way.
In the broad sense that both fetal homicide and abortion involve
the termination of a pregnancy, the concern that abortion rights could
be undermined may seem reasonable. But given the benefits of and
protections provided by fetal homicide laws, it is imprudent to lump
them together with abortion rights and to fear that the public cannot
discern the widely divergent contexts in which the issues arise.
Finally, although the decision to terminate a pregnancy is
constitutionally protected, the decision to carry a child to term does
not enjoy such uniform protection. To fully preserve a woman’s
ability to choose, rather than just her ability to terminate a pregnancy,
that woman’s choice to give birth should be granted every protection
afforded to her choice to abort. If the mother’s choice should control,
the laws of the state should be nothing other than neutral toward her
decision. If the state protects one choice more completely than the
other, then the mother’s decision is influenced, and she loses some
power to choose.
When a woman elects to have an abortion, the Constitution
protects her choice against governmental interference—the most
powerful protection an individual can possess against the state. To be
consistent, then (if the goal is truly to protect a woman’s right to
control her pregnancy), it is reasonable to afford a woman who
chooses to give birth to her unborn child the most powerful
protection that an individual can possess against other individuals
because those individuals are the ones who could potentially curtail
198
her right to carry the fetus to term. That most powerful protection,
then, is to punish the killing of the fetus as homicide.
197. See, e.g., Kole & Kadetsky, supra note 13, at 235 (“[W]hile the Act may not legally
affect the right to abortion, its rhetoric will likely color the abortion debate and the legal battles
of the next century.”).
198. This is not to suggest that the law should impose homicide to punish a third party for
violating a mother’s constitutional right to choose. Rather, the benefit comes from granting a
woman the ability to determine, solely through her subjective intent, that her fetus is a “person”
for the purposes of the homicide statute. See supra notes 188–92 and accompanying text. Once a
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In sum, fetal homicide laws can be harmoniously reconciled with
a woman’s right to an abortion because the mother’s consent is the
determining factor. As such, because the mother has the complete
prerogative to determine whether she wants the pregnancy, her
reproductive freedoms remain firmly in her hands. Fetal homicide
laws allow for greater protection against criminal acts without
requiring the mother to forfeit any rights at all.
C. Ideal Legislative Framework
The most complete approach to addressing feticide is through a
comprehensive regime of fetal homicide laws that specifically define
the crimes against the unborn and expressly indicate the punishments
for the offenses. The Minnesota statutes illustrate this approach
199
well. Although judicial abandonment of the born-alive rule should
be encouraged—because doing so would bring unborn children within
the meaning of “human being” in states’ general homicide statutes—
legislative action enables a state to create a comprehensive system of
feticide-specific laws. Moreover, legislators also can include explicit
protections in an effort to allay concerns that feticide statutes will
200
infringe on women’s constitutional rights.
Additionally, given the rationale for classifying the killing of an
unborn child as homicide, it is arbitrary for lawmakers to distinguish
between those fetuses that are viable and those that are not. To fully
protect pregnant mothers and unborn children, fetal homicide laws
must apply at every stage of gestation. A nonviable fetus is as much a
human organism as is a viable fetus, and the mother has the same
interest in protecting the life of her unborn offspring regardless of the
child’s gestational age. Thus, to be fully effective and theoretically
sound, the ideal fetal homicide regime should punish equally the
murder of a previable unborn child and the murder of a full-term
unborn child.
The ideal legislative framework for addressing feticide would
combine the Minnesota and Texas approaches. Minnesota’s approach
mother makes this determination, a third party who kills the fetus can be punished for homicide
because the third party ended a life that the law treats as a person. For more on the
justifications for the severity of the punishment, see infra Part IV.D.
199. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266–.2691 (West 2006).
200. Legislators can, for example, include a provision indicating that the state cannot apply
the fetal homicide statute in the context of a controlled, legal abortion. E.g., id. § 609.269
(“Sections 609.2661 to 609.268 [the sections defining the crimes against the unborn] do not apply
to any act described in section 145.412 [the section defining legal abortion].”).
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benefits from treating feticide comprehensively, as it includes
provisions that specifically immunize the mother from liability and
that make the statutes inapplicable in the abortion context. This
exhaustive treatment helps to assuage fears raised by abortion rights
advocates.
But the Minnesota regime is nevertheless imperfect because it
defines fetal homicide in separate statutes from the general homicide
201
provisions. This organization emphasizes the separateness of the
offenses, even though, as to third parties, the law should not treat
feticide differently than other homicides. For the sake of theoretical
soundness, as well as simplicity, the state’s general homicide statute
should address feticide.
Texas takes this approach but errs in the opposite direction: it
defines an “individual” as “a human being who is alive, including an
unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth,”
but it does so in the general definitions section that applies to the
202
entire penal code. Although it is possible to confine this definition
to only the homicide context by careful use of the term “individual,”
this approach is also more likely to reach unwanted results by
inadvertently including the term in an unrelated provision. Thus, to
reduce the likelihood of errors, statutes should define “individual” or
“human being” to include a fetus only in those statutory provisions—
like homicide—in which the legislature desires this definition.
Accordingly, feticide would ideally be covered in a general
homicide statute that begins by defining “individual” as “a human
being who is alive, including an unborn child at every stage of
203
gestation from fertilization until birth.” The statute would then
define the crime of homicide in its various degrees. It would also
include provisions that immunize mothers from liability and make the
statute inapplicable to legal, controlled abortions.
D. What about Defendants?
Thus far, this Note has focused almost exclusively on the victims
of feticide—the pregnant women and their unborn children. For a
more complete picture, this Section briefly considers how fetal
homicide laws affect defendants.

201. See id. § 609.18–.22 (homicide); id. § 609.2661 (feticide).
202. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
203. Id.
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Treating feticide as homicide is a significant judgment that likely
has severe consequences for defendants. The severity of the
punishment is primarily justified by the legal personhood bestowed
204
on the fetus through the mother’s subjective intent. When she alone
decides that the pregnancy is wanted, fetal homicide laws protect the
fetus (though the fetus would continue to have no legal personhood
for any other purpose—specifically, the fetus would not have any
additional rights against the mother beyond those already granted in
205
Roe v. Wade ). Because the fetus’s personhood is tied to the
mother’s intent, the fetal homicide context remains analytically
distinct from other instances in which the state seeks to protect
important interests. Thus, charging a defendant with homicide for
killing an unborn child is logically sound, even though the penalty
could be severe.
Moreover, determining that feticide is legally equivalent to
homicide would not preordain the punishment for any specific
defendant. The same gradations of severity that apply in the homicide
206
context would continue to apply when the victim is a fetus. The
severity of the punishment would correspond to the defendant’s mens
rea—thus, sentences would vary depending on whether the defendant
purposely or knowingly caused the death of the fetus (analogous to
207
murder), recklessly caused the death of the fetus (analogous to
208
manslaughter), or only negligently caused the death of the fetus
209
(analogous to negligent homicide).
This result is intuitive: the defendant’s lack of knowledge of the
woman’s pregnancy should prevent the defendant from being charged
with the most severe fetal homicide crime—the fetal homicide
204. See supra notes 188–92 and accompanying text.
205. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
206. This discussion is based on the Model Penal Code definitions of mens rea: “Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when . . . it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result,” MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(a) (1985); “Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element
of an offense when . . . if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such result,” id. § 2.02(b); “Recklessly. A person
acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct,” id. § 2.02(c); “Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material
element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct,” id. § 2.02(d).
207. Id. § 210.2.
208. Id. § 210.3.
209. Id. § 210.4.
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equivalent of murder. But lack of knowledge should not entirely
exonerate the defendant from all criminal liability because the
210
defendant did, nevertheless, cause the death of the fetus. The best
approach, then, is that the defendant’s level of culpability as to the
fetus should determine the severity of the fetal homicide crime with
which the defendant is charged.
For instance, if the defendant intentionally kills the mother but is
unaware that she is pregnant, the defendant should be liable for
murder as to the mother and for manslaughter or negligent homicide
as to the fetus, depending on whether the facts of the case
demonstrate that the defendant consciously disregarded the
211
possibility of the woman’s pregnancy. If the defendant knew that
the woman was pregnant prior to purposely killing her, the defendant
should be liable for the most severe crime of homicide as to both the
mother and the fetus because the defendant knowingly caused both
212
deaths.
Finally, legislatures can also use sentencing provisions to finetune a fetal homicide punishment depending on the factors that they
deem relevant. For instance, a legislature could determine that a
defendant who merely knowingly kills a fetus should be punished less
harshly than one who purposely does so. Thus, given the potential for
flexibility, legislatures can enact a functional and fair fetal homicide
regime using mens rea gradations that are already in place.
CONCLUSION
Fetal homicide laws provide powerful protections to both the
mother and the unborn child without undermining the constitutional
rights of the mother. By protecting the mother’s decision to bring the
fetus to term, these laws give fuller effect to the woman’s right to
210. Because the fetus in this statutory regime would possess personhood for fetal homicide
purposes, see supra notes 191–92 and accompanying text, the defendant cannot end that fetus’s
life with immunity.
211. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2–.4. Section 210.2 explains that “criminal homicide
constitutes murder when: (a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Id.
§ 210.2. Section 210.3 explains that “[c]riminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: (a) it is
committed recklessly.” Id. § 210.3. And section 210.4 explains that “[c]riminal homicide
constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently.” Id. § 210.4. Thus, the severity
of the defendant’s crime depends on the defendant’s mental state regarding the victim’s
pregnancy.
212. See id. § 210.2 (“[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when . . . it is committed
purposely or knowingly . . . .”).
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choose. In this way, fetal homicide laws and the constitutionally
protected right to an abortion are not adversaries; rather, they are
complements that can be harmoniously reconciled.
Moreover, the born-alive rule serves no purpose in the modern
law other than to blindly imitate the past. The rule has simply
outlived both its necessity and utility, and states should accordingly
abandon it. Those states that continue to apply the rule and decline to
extend the scope of homicide statutes to include a fetus as a potential
homicide victim do their citizens—both born and unborn—an
injustice.
In 1970, when the California legislature amended the state
homicide statute to include the term “fetus,” the state was a maverick,
blazing a trail away from the accepted notion that homicide laws did
not apply to the unborn. Over the following decades, other courts and
legislatures followed suit until, in 1990, feticide was regarded as a
213
homicide in nineteen states. In that year, however, legislative
creation of a comprehensive statutory regime to address fetal
214
homicide was still seen as “most unusual.” As of 2009, thirty-six
states have classified the killing of an unborn child as homicide. The
fourteen others that have not ought to bring their laws in line with
modern understandings of justice by adopting a comprehensive,
internally consistent statutory regime that incorporates feticide into
traditional homicide laws. Only in this manner can the law fully
protect both a mother and her unborn child.

213. State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. 1990).
214. Id.

